"I Won the Election!": An Empirical Analysis of Soft Moderation Interventions on Twitter

Over the past few years, there is a heated debate and serious public concerns regarding online content moderation, censorship, and the principle of free speech on the Web. To ease these concerns, social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook refined their content moderation systems to support soft moderation interventions. Soft moderation interventions refer to warning labels attached to potentially questionable or harmful content to inform other users about the content and its nature while the content remains accessible, hence alleviating concerns related to censorship and free speech. In this work, we perform one of the first empirical studies on soft moderation interventions on Twitter. Using a mixed-methods approach, we study the users who share tweets with warning labels on Twitter and their political leaning, the engagement that these tweets receive, and how users interact with tweets that have warning labels. Among other things, we find that 72% of the tweets with warning labels are shared by Republicans, while only 11% are shared by Democrats. By analyzing content engagement, we find that tweets with warning labels had more engagement compared to tweets without warning labels. Also, we qualitatively analyze how users interact with content that has warning labels finding that the most popular interactions are related to further debunking false claims, mocking the author or content of the disputed tweet, and further reinforcing or resharing false claims. Finally, we describe concrete examples of inconsistencies, such as warning labels that are incorrectly added or warning labels that are not added on tweets despite sharing questionable and potentially harmful information.Comment: Accepted in the 15th AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM 2021

A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online Antisemitism

A new wave of growing antisemitism, driven by fringe Web communities, is an increasingly worrying presence in the socio-political realm. The ubiquitous and global nature of the Web has provided tools used by these groups to spread their ideology to the rest of the Internet. Although the study of antisemitism and hate is not new, the scale and rate of change of online data has impacted the efficacy of traditional approaches to measure and understand these troubling trends. In this paper, we present a large-scale, quantitative study of online antisemitism. We collect hundreds of million posts and images from alt-right Web communities like 4chan's Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and Gab. Using scientifically grounded methods, we quantify the escalation and spread of antisemitic memes and rhetoric across the Web. We find the frequency of antisemitic content greatly increases (in some cases more than doubling) after major political events such as the 2016 US Presidential Election and the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville. We extract semantic embeddings from our corpus of posts and demonstrate how automated techniques can discover and categorize the use of antisemitic terminology. We additionally examine the prevalence and spread of the antisemitic "Happy Merchant" meme, and in particular how these fringe communities influence its propagation to more mainstream communities like Twitter and Reddit. Taken together, our results provide a data-driven, quantitative framework for understanding online antisemitism. Our methods serve as a framework to augment current qualitative efforts by anti-hate groups, providing new insights into the growth and spread of hate online.Comment: To appear at the 14th International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM 2020). Please cite accordingl

Reading In-Between the Lines: An Analysis of Dissenter

Efforts by content creators and social networks to enforce legal and policy-based norms, e.g. blocking hate speech and users, has driven the rise of unrestricted communication platforms. One such recent effort is Dissenter, a browser and web application that provides a conversational overlay for any web page. These conversations hide in plain sight - users of Dissenter can see and participate in this conversation, whereas visitors using other browsers are oblivious to their existence. Further, the website and content owners have no power over the conversation as it resides in an overlay outside their control. In this work, we obtain a history of Dissenter comments, users, and the websites being discussed, from the initial release of Dissenter in Feb. 2019 through Apr. 2020 (14 months). Our corpus consists of approximately 1.68M comments made by 101k users commenting on 588k distinct URLs. We first analyze macro characteristics of the network, including the user-base, comment distribution, and growth. We then use toxicity dictionaries, Perspective API, and a Natural Language Processing model to understand the nature of the comments and measure the propensity of particular websites and content to elicit hateful and offensive Dissenter comments. Using curated rankings of media bias, we examine the conditional probability of hateful comments given left and right-leaning content. Finally, we study Dissenter as a social network, and identify a core group of users with high comment toxicity.Comment: Accepted at IMC 202

Before Blue Birds Became X-tinct: Understanding the Effect of Regime Change on Twitter's Advertising and Compliance of Advertising Policies

Social media platforms, including Twitter (now X), have policies in place to maintain a safe and trustworthy advertising environment. However, the extent to which these policies are adhered to and enforced remains a subject of interest and concern. We present the first large-scale audit of advertising on Twitter focusing on compliance with the platform's advertising policies, particularly those related to political and adult content. We investigate the compliance of advertisements on Twitter with the platform's stated policies and the impact of recent acquisition on the advertising activity of the platform. By analyzing 34K advertisements from ~6M tweets, collected over six months, we find evidence of widespread noncompliance with Twitter's political and adult content advertising policies suggesting a lack of effective ad content moderation. We also find that Elon Musk's acquisition of Twitter had a noticeable impact on the advertising landscape, with most existing advertisers either completely stopping their advertising activity or reducing it. Major brands decreased their advertising on Twitter, suggesting a negative immediate effect on the platform's advertising revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of external audits to monitor compliance and improve transparency in online advertising

The Web of False Information: Rumors, Fake News, Hoaxes, Clickbait, and Various Other Shenanigans

A new era of Information Warfare has arrived. Various actors, including state-sponsored ones, are weaponizing information on Online Social Networks to run false information campaigns with targeted manipulation of public opinion on specific topics. These false information campaigns can have dire consequences to the public: mutating their opinions and actions, especially with respect to critical world events like major elections. Evidently, the problem of false information on the Web is a crucial one, and needs increased public awareness, as well as immediate attention from law enforcement agencies, public institutions, and in particular, the research community. In this paper, we make a step in this direction by providing a typology of the Web's false information ecosystem, comprising various types of false information, actors, and their motives. We report a comprehensive overview of existing research on the false information ecosystem by identifying several lines of work: 1) how the public perceives false information; 2) understanding the propagation of false information; 3) detecting and containing false information on the Web; and 4) false information on the political stage. In this work, we pay particular attention to political false information as: 1) it can have dire consequences to the community (e.g., when election results are mutated) and 2) previous work show that this type of false information propagates faster and further when compared to other types of false information. Finally, for each of these lines of work, we report several future research directions that can help us better understand and mitigate the emerging problem of false information dissemination on the Web

Who let the trolls out? Towards understanding state-sponsored trolls

Recent evidence has emerged linking coordinated campaigns by state-sponsored actors to manipulate public opinion on the Web. Campaigns revolving around major political events are enacted via mission-focused ?trolls." While trolls are involved in spreading disinformation on social media, there is little understanding of how they operate, what type of content they disseminate, how their strategies evolve over time, and how they influence the Web's in- formation ecosystem. In this paper, we begin to address this gap by analyzing 10M posts by 5.5K Twitter and Reddit users identified as Russian and Iranian state-sponsored trolls. We compare the behavior of each group of state-sponsored trolls with a focus on how their strategies change over time, the different campaigns they embark on, and differences between the trolls operated by Russia and Iran. Among other things, we find: 1) that Russian trolls were pro-Trump while Iranian trolls were anti-Trump; 2) evidence that campaigns undertaken by such actors are influenced by real-world events; and 3) that the behavior of such actors is not consistent over time, hence detection is not straightforward. Using Hawkes Processes, we quantify the influence these accounts have on pushing URLs on four platforms: Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), and Gab. In general, Russian trolls were more influential and efficient in pushing URLs to all the other platforms with the exception of /pol/ where Iranians were more influential. Finally, we release our source code to ensure the reproducibility of our results and to encourage other researchers to work on understanding other emerging kinds of state-sponsored troll accounts on Twitter.https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03130.pdfAccepted manuscrip

The Pushshift Telegram Dataset

Messaging platforms, especially those with a mobile focus, have become increasingly ubiquitous in society. These mobile messaging platforms can have deceivingly large user bases, and in addition to being a way for people to stay in touch, are often used to organize social movements, as well as a place for extremists and other ne'er-do-well to congregate. In this paper, we present a dataset from one such mobile messaging platform: Telegram. Our dataset is made up of over 27.8K channels and 317M messages from 2.2M unique users. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset comprises the largest and most complete of its kind. In addition to the raw data, we also provide the source code used to collect it, allowing researchers to run their own data collection instance. We believe the Pushshift Telegram dataset can help researchers from a variety of disciplines interested in studying online social movements, protests, political extremism, and disinformation

"And We Will Fight For Our Race!" A Measurement Study of Genetic Testing Conversations on Reddit and 4chan

Rapid progress in genomics has enabled a thriving market for “direct-to-consumer” genetic testing, whereby people have access to their genetic information without the involvement of a healthcare provider. Companies like 23andMe and AncestryDNA, which provide affordable health, genealogy, and ancestry reports, have already tested tens of millions of customers. At the same time, alas, far-right groups have also taken an interest in genetic testing, using them to attack minorities and prove their genetic “purity.” However, the relation between genetic testing and online hate has not really been studied by the scientific community. To address this gap, we present a measurement study shedding light on how genetic testing is discussed on Web communities in Reddit and 4chan. We collect 1.3M comments posted over 27 months using a set of 280 keywords related to genetic testing. We then use Latent Dirichlet Allocation, Google’s Perspective API, Perceptual Hashing, and word embeddings to identify trends, themes, and topics of discussion. Our analysis shows that genetic testing is discussed frequently on Reddit and 4chan, and often includes highly toxic language expressed through hateful, racist, and misogynistic comments. In particular, on 4chan’s politically incorrect board (/pol/), content from genetic testing conversations involves several alt-right personalities and openly antisemitic memes. Finally, we find that genetic testing appears in a few unexpected contexts, and that users seem to build groups ranging from technology enthusiasts to communities using it to promote fringe political views